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GARNER v. STATE: MARYLAND’S IMPLIED RETREAT  
FROM IMPLIED ASSERTIONS  
LINDSEY N. LANZENDORFER*
 
 
In Garner v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland confronted 
the concept of implied assertions2 for the fourth time in the history of 
the court’s hearsay jurisprudence.3  The Garner court addressed the 
admissibility of an out-of-court declarant’s question, “can I get a 40?,”4 
when the State offered the question to prove that the defendant sold 
drugs.5  Pursuant to Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-801,6 the court held 
that the utterance was not hearsay, in part because it did not contain 
the assertion it was offered to prove, and, thus, the question was ad-
missible.7
In so holding, the Garner court failed to apply its precedent, 
which states that an implied assertion is usually hearsay.
   
8
 
Copyright © 2012 by Lindsey N. Lanzendorfer. 
  Instead, the 
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invaluable knowledge of evidence.  The author also thanks Kathleen Harne and Kristina 
Foehrkolb for their insight and advice, and the editors of the Maryland Law Review for 
their meticulous editing.  Finally, she thanks Daniel McCulley and Van and Lisa Lanzen-
dorfer for their love and encouragement.  
 1. 414 Md. 372, 995 A.2d 694 (2010). 
 2. An implied assertion is an out-of-court utterance that its proponent offers to prove 
the truth of something the declarant implied but did not directly state.  See Paul S. Milich, 
Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing The Rule and Starting Over, 71 OR. L. REV. 723, 
728–29 (1992) (discussing when implied assertions will be considered hearsay). 
 3. The first time the court confronted implied assertions was in Waters v. Waters, 35 
Md. 531 (1872).  The second time was in Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 887 A.2d 564 
(2005). The third time was in Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 887 A.2d 602 (2005). 
 4. Garner, 414 Md. at 374, 995 A.2d at 695.  The State used the statement to argue that 
Garner was selling cocaine.  Id. at 376, 995 A.2d at 696.   
 5. Id. at 376, 995 A.2d at 696–97.  
 6. Rule 5-801 has three parts. 5-801(a) states, “A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an asser-
tion.”  MD. R. 5-801(a).  Rule 5-801(b) states, “A ‘declarant’ is a person who makes a state-
ment.”  MD. R. 5-801(b).  Rule 5-801(c) states, “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted.”  MD. R. 5-801(c).   
 7. Garner, 414 Md. at 388, 995 A.2d at 704. 
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
LanzendorferFinalBookProof 3/14/2012  12:27 PM 
620 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:619 
court implicitly followed federal and state courts’ holdings that im-
plied assertions are typically not hearsay and, in turn, altered Mary-
land precedent for determining whether an implied assertion is hear-
say under Maryland law.9  This holding, because of its vagueness, 
could lead to inconsistent arguments by litigants, ad hoc rulings by 
trial judges, and conflicting standards of review by appellate judges.10  
To avoid unpredictability in the application of implied assertion ad-
missibility standards in Maryland, the Court of Appeals should have 
explicitly held that implied assertions are not hearsay under Maryland 
Rule of Evidence 5-801.11  Such a holding would have ended the 
struggle that Maryland courts have with implied assertions and pre-
vented implied assertions from swallowing the hearsay rule.12
I.  THE CASE 
 
The Maryland State Police arrested Alphonso Garner on June 22, 
2006, for driving with a suspended license.13  The police searched his 
car as an incident to his arrest and discovered thirteen individually 
wrapped baggies of cocaine inside a fuse box in the glove compart-
ment.14  At the police station, one trooper confiscated Garner’s cell 
phone.15  Later, the phone rang and the trooper answered it.16  After 
the trooper said hello, the caller asked, “can I get a 40?,” but hung up 
when the trooper asked the caller his name.17
At Garner’s trial, the State offered the unidentified caller’s ques-
tion to show that Garner was a drug dealer.
   
18  First, an officer testified 
that the caller asked, “can I get a 40?,” and then a corporal testified 
that a “40” is a common reference to four-tenths of a gram of crack 
cocaine.  The State used the out-of-court utterance in closing argu-
ment to show Garner was a drug dealer and not merely a drug user.19  
The prosecutor said, “why pr[ay]-tell [sic], would you call [a] user and 
ask him for a 40[?]  Because he is not a user.”20
 
 9. See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
  Further, in his rebut-
 10. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 11. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 12. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 13. Garner v. State, 183 Md. App. 122, 126, 960 A.2d 649, 650–51 (2008), aff’d, 414 Md. 
372, 995 A.2d 694 (2010). 
 14. Id., 960 A.2d at 651. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.   
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 135, 960 A.2d at 656. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372, 376, 995 A.2d 694, 697 (2010). 
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tal argument, the prosecutor argued, “[B]ut I keep coming back, I 
know I said this before, you do not, you do not ca[ll] [a] user [—] a  
mere user of cocaine [—] and ask him for a 40.”21
A jury in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County convicted 
Garner for, inter alia, possession of cocaine with the intent to distri-
bute.
   
22  Garner appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, arguing that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court 
admitted the anonymous caller’s question into evidence.23  Garner 
argued that the trooper who answered Garner’s cell phone should 
not have been allowed to testify as to the substance of the conversa-
tion because it was hearsay.24
Garner argued that the anonymous caller was asserting that he 
believed Garner was a drug dealer when he asked if he could “get a 
40.”
   
25  Since the caller did not actually say Garner sold cocaine, this 
assertion would necessarily be implied.  Because the State offered the 
question to prove that Garner sold cocaine, the implied assertion was 
offered for the matter impliedly asserted.  As such, Garner argued, 
the question was hearsay and should not have been admitted into evi-
dence.26
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals disagreed and held that 
the question was not hearsay, in part, because the question did not 
contain an assertion.
 
27  Although Maryland includes implied asser-
tions in its hearsay ambit, the Court of Special Appeals determined 
that it would not interpret implied assertions broadly enough to in-
clude the out-of-court question in Garner’s case.28  The court ex-
plained that defining implied assertion as any utterance that a party 
can use to prove any relevant fact effectively excises the word “asser-
tion” out of the definition of hearsay.29
 
 21. Id. 
  Indeed, the court determined 
 22. Garner, 183 Md. App. at 125, 960 A.2d at 650.  He was also convicted of driving with 
a revoked license, and other related offenses that were merged for sentencing.  Id. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 134–35, 960 A.2d at 655–56. 
 25. Id. at 145, 960 A.2d at 662.   
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 146, 150, 960 A.2d at 662, 665 (explaining that a narrow reading of im-
plied assertion precedent would permit the court to find the anonymous caller’s question 
was non-hearsay and concluding that the court would not give implied assertion precedent 
a liberal interpretation).  
 28. See id. at 145–50, 960 A.2d at 662–65 (explaining and interpreting the Court of Ap-
peals implied assertion precedent). 
 29. Id. at 145–46, 960 A.2d at 662. 
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that, in this case, every utterance could be deemed an implied asser-
tion of what it is offered to prove.30
The Court of Appeals granted Garner’s petition for certiorari to 
determine whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding the 
out-of-court caller’s question was not hearsay.
 
31
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
   
Both Maryland and federal courts have traditionally held hearsay 
to be inadmissible evidence.32  The definition of hearsay is similar 
across jurisdictions: hearsay is an out-of-court statement (assertion), 
made by a declarant, offered for the truth of the matter asserted.33  
However, for years courts have debated what falls under that defini-
tion.  For instance, courts often struggle with whether implied asser-
tions can be considered hearsay.  An English common law court first 
considered implied assertions as part of the hearsay definition.34  
Maryland courts have followed the same path and held that implied 
assertions can still fall into the definition of hearsay, but have strug-
gled to determine the scope of implied assertions.35  By contrast, a 
majority of federal and state courts have eliminated implied assertion 
from the definition of hearsay.36
A.  Hearsay 
 
Under the Maryland and federal rules of evidence, hearsay is 
generally inadmissible as evidence.37  The rules define hearsay as “a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted.”38  The rules define declarant as “a person who makes a 
statement.”39  Finally, the rules define a statement as “(1) an oral or 
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is in-
tended by the person as an assertion.”40
 
 30. Id. at 145, 960 A.2d at 662. 
   
 31. Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372, 374, 995 A.2d 694, 695 (2010). 
 32. See infra Part II.A. 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
 35. See infra Part II.C. 
 36. See infra Part II.D. 
 37. MD. R. 5-802; FED. R. EVID. 802.  
 38. MD. R. 5-801(c); FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 39. MD. R. 5-801(b); FED. R. EVID. 801(b). 
 40. MD. R. 5-801(a); FED. R. EVID. 801(a).  
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The rules do not define an assertion, but the courts have defined 
it as words that can be proven true or false.41  Generally an assertion is 
in the indicative or declarative speech, rather than in the interroga-
tive, the imperative, or the subjunctive forms of speech.42  Finally, if a 
proponent of an out-of-court utterance offers the utterance to prove 
the truth of something the declarant believed, but did not directly 
state, then the utterance is considered to be an implied assertion.43
Whether implied assertions qualify as assertions under the hear-
say definition is important because the rules exclude hearsay from 
evidence at trial.
  
The question is whether implied assertions are to be included as as-
sertions under the hearsay definition. 
44  Hearsay is excluded to protect the trier of fact 
from considering unreliable evidence.45  The Supreme Court of the 
United States has recognized that out-of-court statements pose four 
risks of unreliability: memory, perception, narration, and sincerity.  
First, the declarant may have a faulty recollection of the event when 
she made the statement about the event.46  Second, she may not have 
accurately observed the event when she made the statement.47  Third, 
her words may have been ambiguous.48  Fourth, she may have fabri-
cated her statement.49  Without cross-examination, an out-of-court ut-
terance is untested as to these four dangers.50  For these reasons, 
courts do not admit hearsay into evidence unless it falls under an ex-
ception.51
 
 41. E.g., Holland v. State, 122 Md. App. 532, 543–44, 713 A.2d 364, 369–70 (1998). 
   
 42. Id. 
 43. Milich, supra note 2, at 728–29. 
 44. MD. R. 5-802; FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 45. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994) (explaining the dan-
gers of presenting an out-of-court statement to the jury). 
 46. See id. (“The declarant might . . . have faulty memory.”). 
 47. See id. (“The declarant might . . . have misperceived the events which he relates.”). 
 48. See id. (“The declarant[’s] words might be misunderstood or taken out of context 
by the listener.”). 
 49. See id. (“The declarant might be lying.”); see also Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 
696, 887 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (identifying fabrication as one of the four hearsay factors). 
 50. Stoddard, 389 Md. at 697, 887 A.2d at 573. 
 51. MD. R. 5-802.  The exceptions are located under Md. R. 5-802.1, 5-803, 5-804, and 5-
805. 
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B.  Wright v. Tatham Includes Implied Assertions in the Definition of 
Hearsay 
The English common law case Wright v. Tatham52 first discussed 
the concept of implied assertion.53  There, an heir filed suit to recover 
land from a deceased man, John Marsden, as a devisee under will.54  
The case turned on whether Marsden had been competent to make a 
will.55  To prove Marsden’s competence, the defense provided three 
letters written to Marsden that discussed business and personal affairs 
to show the writers of the letters believed Marsden was a competent 
man.56  The Court of Exchequer Chamber, an English appellate 
court, was divided, and issued six written opinions.57
[P]roof of a particular fact which is not of itself a matter in 
issue, but which is relevant only as implying a statement or 
opinion of a third person on the matter in issue, is inadmiss-
ible in all cases where such a statement or opinion not on 
oath would be of itself inadmissible . . . .
  Baron Parke, 
one of the judges, argued that the letters did contain an assertion that 
Marsden was competent and therefore should be excluded from evi-
dence.  Finding that implied assertions are inadmissible, he wrote:   
58
Baron Parke explained this reasoning in a hypothetical.  Suppose 
that a sea captain put his family on board a vessel and embarked into 
the sea.
 
59  If his conduct were offered in court to prove the vessel was 
seaworthy, it would be hearsay because the captain must have believed 
the vessel was seaworthy or he would not have put his family on board.  
In other words, his actions impliedly assert the vessel was seaworthy, 
even though the sea captain did not directly state the vessel was sea-
worthy.60
Similarly, Baron Parke determined that the letters written to 
Marsden were inadmissible because the defense offered those letters 
to prove the competence of the testator—the truth of the implied 
   
 
 52. (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B.); see Stoddard, 389 Md. at 691, 887 A.2d at 570 (not-
ing that Wright v. Tatham is the “starting point for a discussion of the implied assertion 
doctrine”). 
 53. 112 Eng. Rep. at 516–17. 
 54. Id. at 489. 
 55. See id. at 492–93 (explaining the significance of the letters written to the testator). 
 56. Id. at 488–89 (describing the content of the letters).  The content of the letters are 
reproduced in the court’s opinion.  Id. at 490–93. 
 57. Id. at 524. 
 58. Id. at 516. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  
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statements contained in the letter.61 More generally, if an out-of-court 
implied assertion is offered for the truth, then it is hearsay.62
C.  Maryland Appellate Courts Consistently Included Implied Assertions 
in Their Definition of Hearsay, but Have Struggled to Determine the 
Scope of Implied Assertions 
  
The Maryland Court of Appeals found that implied assertions 
were hearsay when offered for their truth, following Baron Parke’s 
reasoning, before and after the adoption of the Maryland Rules of 
Evidence in 1994.63  But the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has 
struggled to determine exactly what out-of-court utterances fall into 
the category of implied assertions.64
1.  The Maryland Court of Appeals Holds Implied Assertions Can Be 
Hearsay Before and After Maryland Codified Its Rules of Evidence 
 
The Court of Appeals had only addressed the issue of implied as-
sertions three times before 2010’s Garner v. State.  The first time was in 
the 1872 case Waters v. Waters,65 decided well before Maryland codi-
fied its rules of evidence.66  The second and third times were in Stod-
dard v. State67 and Bernadyn v. State,68 which were decided on the same 
day in 2005, eleven years after Maryland’s adoption of its rules of evi-
dence.69
In Waters, the Court of Appeals considered whether two written 
letters of a testator’s friend were hearsay when they were offered to 
prove the testator was competent and sane to transact business.
 
70
 
 61. Id. at 517. 
  
Under facts that were strikingly similar to the facts of the English case, 
Wright, the court held that the proponent of the letters offered them 
 62. For another example, see United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1111–16 (2d Cir. 
1974) (finding defendant’s family members’ statements, such as “there is a million places 
to put a body and you don’t have to . . . burn it up and leave it laying right out in the mid-
dle of nowhere for people to find,” were inadmissible to demonstrate the defendant’s fam-
ily believed he committed a murder because the statements were hearsay). 
 63. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 64. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 65. 35 Md. 531 (1872). 
 66. The rules were codified in 1994.  Barry Herman, Note, Closing the Door on the Resi-
dual Hearsay Exception, 57 MD. L. REV. 865, 875 (1998).  
 67. 389 Md. 681, 887 A.2d 564 (2005). 
 68. 390 Md. 1, 887 A.2d 602 (2005). 
 69. The date was December 8, 2005.  See Stoddard, 389 Md. at 681, 887 A.2d at 564; Ber-
nadyn, 390 Md. at 1, 887 A.2d at 602. 
 70. Waters, 35 Md. at 536. 
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for the implied assertion that the testator was competent, and there-
fore the letters were inadmissible.71  Explaining why the letters should 
be excluded, the court stated that the letters were assertions of the 
writer but the writer had not been under oath when he made them.72
The Court of Appeals did not address implied assertions again 
until after Maryland codified the Maryland Rules of Evidence in 1994.  
Although the Maryland Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a state-
ment and a statement as an assertion,
 
73 the rules committee left the 
definition of assertion up to the courts, finding that it was a “concept 
best left to the development in the case law.”74  In turn, the Court of 
Appeals has joined a minority of courts in holding that implied asser-
tions are hearsay when offered for their truth because they contain 
the same hearsay dangers as direct assertions.75
For example, in Stoddard v. State, decided in 2005, the Court of 
Appeals addressed the admissibility of a young girl’s out-of-court 
statement, “Is Erik going to get me?”
 
76  The State offered the state-
ment to prove that the girl witnessed Erik Stoddard, the defendant, 
harm another child.77  The defendant argued that the utterance was 
hearsay because it included the implied assertion that the girl actually 
saw the defendant harm another child.78  In other words, when the 
girl asked her mother “Is Erik going to get me?” she also was implicitly 
stating, “I saw Erik hit Calen.”79
The Court of Appeals explained that if “the probative value of 
words, as offered, depends on the declarant having communicated a 
factual proposition, the words constitute an ‘assertion’ of that propo-
sition.”
 
80
 
 71. Id. at 544–45. 
  That is, if the proponent of evidence offers an out-of-court 
utterance to prove a proposition that was not directly asserted in the 
 72. Id. at 544. 
 73. See supra notes 38–40. 
 74. MD. R. 5–801 advisory committee’s note.  Maryland’s intermediate appellate court 
has acknowledged the difference between the federal and Maryland advisory committees’ 
notes.  See Carlton v. State, 111 Md. App. 436, 442, 681 A.2d 1181, 1184 (1996) (“Based on 
the committee’s note, it would appear that the drafters of Maryland Rule 5-801 rejected 
the view that implied assertions are never hearsay.”). 
 75. See infra notes 76–93 and accompanying text. 
 76. 389 Md. 681, 683, 887 A.2d 564, 565 (2005). 
 77. See id. at 686, 887 A.2d at 567 (citing the State’s closing argument where the State 
argued that the girl was the only eyewitness to Stoddard’s crime). 
 78. Id. at 686–87, 887 A.2d at 567. 
 79. See id. at 689, 887 A.2d at 569 (explaining that the statement was offered to prove 
the girl had witnessed Stoddard assault Calen).  Calen was the child Stoddard allegedly 
murdered.  Id. at 683, 887 A.2d at 565. 
 80. Id. at 703–04, 887 A.2d at 577. 
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utterance, but the declarant must have believed the proposition for 
the utterance to be relevant, then the utterance is inadmissible hear-
say.  In support of including implied assertions offered for their truth 
in the definition of hearsay, the court stated that implied assertions 
raise the same dangers as direct assertions, including insincerity.81  
Indeed, the court argued that if the direct assertion is insincere, then 
the implied assertion is just as insincere and unreliable.82
The Stoddard court also reasoned that whether the declarant in-
tended to communicate a particular factual proposition is irrelevant 
because the declarant still had to believe that proposition.
 
83  Moreo-
ver, even if the declarant did not intend to make the assertion he or 
she made, it does not reveal whether the declarant clearly remembers 
the underlying events.84
Applying this reasoning to the facts in Stoddard, the Court of Ap-
peals first looked to the probative value of the statement (what the 
proponent of the statement offered the statement to prove).
   
85  The 
court found the probative value of the out-of-court utterance, “Is Erik 
going to get me?,” depended on the declarant communicating that 
she saw Stoddard hurt another child.86  Looking then to the decla-
rant’s actual statement, the court found she impliedly asserted that 
she saw Stoddard hit another child.87  But the implied assertion was 
untested as to whether the declarant was serious or joking, untested as 
to whether she might have feared Stoddard because she saw him 
harm another child or for another reason, and untested as to her 
perception of the event, which could have been faulty.88  As such, 
hearsay dangers were present in the implied assertion and the court 
found the out-of-court question was inadmissible hearsay.89
In Bernadyn v. State, the Court of Appeals considered whether a 
medical bill containing the defendant’s name, Michael Bernadyn, and 
 
 
 81. Id. at 703, 887 A.2d at 577. 
 82. Id. (citing State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 594 (Iowa 2003)). 
 83. Id. at 698, 887 A.2d at 574. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 711, 887 A.2d at 582. 
 86. See id. (explaining that the State offered the statement to prove that the child saw 
the defendant harm another child). 
 87. See id. (describing the multiple inferences the jury had to make to accept that the  
girl saw Stoddard harm Calen). 
 88. Id. at 711–12, 887 A.2d at 582.  This applies the four hearsay dangers to the facts of 
the case.  See also supra text accompanying notes 46–49.  
 89. See Stoddard, 389 Md. at 712, 887 A.2d at 582 (“The dangers that arose from the 
State’s use of this question demonstrate the continued utility of the common law approach 
to hearsay.”). 
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an address was hearsay.90  The court first looked to what the State of-
fered the bill to prove.91  The State offered the bill to prove the ad-
dresser believed Bernadyn lived at that particular address.92  The 
court then explained that the bill did not directly assert, “I believe the 
defendant lives at the address on this envelope,” but that assertion was 
implied.  The court found the bill was hearsay because the State of-
fered the addressed bill for the truth of its implied assertion.93
2.  The Maryland Court of Special Appeals Creates a Distinction 
Between Implied Assertions and Circumstantial Evidence 
  These 
cases demonstrate that the Court of Appeals has repeatedly found 
that implied assertions are “assertions” under the hearsay definition. 
Before the Court of Appeals decided Stoddard and Bernadyn, the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals found, in an unreported opinion, 
Fields v. State,94 that a defendant’s name on a bowling alley screen was 
not hearsay when offered to prove the defendant was present at the 
bowling alley on a particular night.95  However, after the Court of Ap-
peals decided Stoddard and Bernadyn, it vacated the Court of Special 
Appeals’ judgment and remanded Fields to the Court of Special Ap-
peals.96
On remand, the Court of Special Appeals again considered 
whether the defendant’s name on the screen was hearsay.
     
97  A person 
present at the bowling alley had put the defendant’s nickname, Sat 
Dogg, on one of the alley’s screens.98  The defendant argued that the 
name was hearsay because the person who typed the name “Sat Dogg” 
on the screen implied that the defendant was present in the bowling 
alley that night.99
Reconsidering its decision in light of Bernadyn, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals distinguished the two cases.
  
100
 
 90. 390 Md. 1, 3, 887 A.2d 602, 603 (2005). 
  The court found that un-
 91. Id. at 9, 887 A.2d at 607. 
 92. Id.  
 93. See id. at 11, 889 A.2d at 608 (explaining that the jury must make several inferences 
to accept the words as proof that Bernadyn lived at the stated address). 
 94. 162 Md. App. 767 (2005), vacated, 390 Md. 513, 889 A.2d 1025 (2006). 
 95. See Fields v. State, 168 Md. App. 22, 26, 895 A.2d 339, 341–42 (2006), aff’d, 395 Md. 
758, 912 A.2d 637 (2006) (describing the court’s previous ruling). 
 96. Fields v. State, 390 Md. 513, 889 A.2d 1025 (2006). 
 97. Fields, 168 Md. App. at 26, 895 A.2d at 341–42. 
 98. See id. at 29, 895 A.2d at 343 (explaining that a detective copied the names from a 
bowling alley screen, and one of them was “Sat Dogg”).   
 99. Id. at 29, 895 A.2d at 343. 
 100. Id. at 36–37, 882 A.2d at 347–48.  The court explained:  
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like Bernadyn, where the State offered an addressed letter to prove 
that the defendant lived at the address because the addresser believed 
he lived at the address, in the present case, the State did not contend 
that the person who wrote the defendant’s name on the bowling alley 
screen believed that the defendant was there.101  As such, the court de-
termined that the name was not an implied assertion.  In fact, the 
court found the declarant did not make any assertion when he or she 
put the name on the bowling alley screen.102
Although the name on the bowling alley screen did not contain 
an assertion, the Court of Special Appeals still determined that the 
probative value of the name on the screen was that it had a tendency 
to show the appellant was at the bowling alley that night.
 
103  Instead of 
containing an implied assertion of what it was offered to prove (that the 
declarant put the defendant’s name on the screen because the decla-
rant saw the defendant there), the court determined the name was 
merely circumstantial evidence that the appellant was at the bowling al-
ley and therefore not hearsay.  In other words, the name was an item 
at the crime scene that the juror could use to infer the defendant was 
at the bowling alley.104
Judge Kenney dissented, arguing that following Bernadyn, the 
name on the bowling alley screen was hearsay.
 
105  Unlike the majority, 
which claimed that the name was circumstantial evidence, Judge 
Kenney contended that circumstantial evidence is more akin to shell 
casings or a vehicle at a crime scene.  But, unlike physical evidence, 
the probative value of the defendant’s name on the bowling alley 
screen was dependent on an unknown person’s belief that one of the 
bowlers was the defendant.106
 
The prosecutor did not attempt to use the evidence of the words “Sat Dogg” 
on the screen at the bowling alley to show that a known declarant believed the 
appellant was present there, had reason to accurately hold that belief, and 
therefore was impliedly asserting that factual proposition by entering his nick-
name on the screen.   
  Thus, Judge Kenney argued, if the dec-
larant did not believe that the defendant was at the bowling alley, the 
evidence would have no purpose.  Judge Kenney pointed out that the 
State had offered the bowling alley screen to prove the declarant’s be-
Id. at 37, 895 A.2d at 348. 
 101. The State argued that the defendant’s nickname was Sat Dogg because that name 
was tattooed on the defendant’s arm and a witness testified that Sat Dogg was the defen-
dant’s nickname.  Id. at 31, 895 A.2d at 344–45. 
 102. Id. at 38, 895 A.2d at 348. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 48, 895 A.2d at 354 (Kenney, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 49–50, 895 A.2d at 355. 
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lief in a certain fact: that the defendant was at the bowling alley.107
After the Court of Special Appeals handed down its decision in 
Fields, the defendant appealed.
  
Therefore, the name was hearsay. 
108  The Court of Appeals declined to 
answer whether the name on the screen was hearsay, instead finding 
that even if the trial judge should not have admitted the name into 
evidence, the error was harmless.109
C.   Following the Adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 801, Many 
Courts Removed Implied Assertions from the Hearsay Definition 
  This holding, as well as the Court 
of Special Appeals holding and Judge Kenney’s dissent in Fields, de-
monstrates that the Maryland courts are struggling to define the 
scope of implied assertions. 
Contrary to Maryland courts, a majority of courts nationwide 
have joined a school of thought that finds implied assertions are no 
longer considered assertions for the purpose of hearsay.110  This large-
ly can be attributed to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
in 1975.111  The federal hearsay definition is exactly the same as the 
Maryland definition;112 Maryland merely adopted the federal lan-
guage.  But the Maryland advisory committee’s note to the hearsay 
rule leaves the definition of assertion up to the courts, while the fed-
eral advisory committee’s note defines assertion.113  The federal 
committee’s note finds that nothing is an assertion unless the decla-
rant intends it to be an assertion.114
 
 107. Id. at 49, 895 A.2d at 355. 
  Although the advisory commit-
tee’s notes are not binding, many federal courts and state courts that 
 108. Fields v. State, 395 Md. 758, 759, 912 A.2d 637 (2006). 
 109. Id. After fully explaining the majority’s and the dissent’s reasoning, the court con-
cluded that the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
present at the bowling alley even without the nickname on the bowling alley screen.  Id. at 
762–64, 912 A.2d at 639–40. 
 110. See Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 731–33, 887 A.2d 564, 594–95 (2005) (Wilner, 
J., concurring) (providing a list of federal and state cases that have found implied asser-
tions are no longer considered to be hearsay). 
 111. Alan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis and Critique, 
54 MD. L. REV. 1032, 1033 (1995).  For a discussion of why the Federal Rules of Evidence 
changed many courts’ approach to implied assertions, see infra Part II.C.1. 
 112. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (defining hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted.”). 
 113. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note (“The key to the definition is 
that nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one.”), with MD. R. 5-801 advisory com-
mittee’s note (“This Rule does not attempt to define ‘assertion,’ a concept best left to de-
velopment in case law.”). 
 114. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note; see also infra Part II.C.1. 
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adopted the Federal Rules have eliminated implied assertions from 
hearsay, citing the note.115
1. The Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 801 
Eliminates Implied Assertions from the Definition of Assertion 
 
The federal rules define hearsay as “a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”116  The rules 
define a statement as “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonver-
bal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an asser-
tion.”117
The rules do not further define assertion, but unlike the Mary-
land advisory committee’s note, which leaves the definition up to the 
courts,
  
118 the federal committee’s note states, “[T]he key to the defi-
nition [of a statement] is that nothing is an assertion unless intended 
to be one.”119
To explain this definition, the federal committee’s note describes 
the difference between assertions and implied assertions.  A verbal ut-
terance is almost always an assertion because the declarant intends to 
assert what he utters.
   
120  Verbal conduct that is assertive, but offered as 
a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted, is an 
implied assertion.121  A non-verbal assertion is an act that the decla-
rant intends to be an assertion, such as the act of pointing to identify 
a suspect in a lineup, because it is the same as assertive words.122  A 
non-verbal implied assertion is conduct that the proponent of the ac-
tion offers to prove a condition by showing that the person acted as 
he or she did because the person believes in the existence of the con-
dition the proponent seeks to prove.  However, the person does not 
actually state his or her belief in the condition, so the belief must be 
inferred.123
Under these definitions, implied assertions cannot be hearsay 
under the federal rules because the declarant never intends to com-
municate the assertion, since the assertion is implied.  In addition, the 
  
 
 115. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 116. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 117. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
 118. MD. R. 5-801 advisory committee’s note. 
 119. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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federal committee’s note explicitly finds that the hearsay definition 
excludes an implied assertion because implied assertions lack the risks 
of sincerity against which the hearsay rule is meant to protect.124
2.  Federal Case Law Follows the Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801 and Excludes Implied Assertions from the 
Hearsay Definition 
   
After the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, very few fed-
eral courts continued to find implied assertions to be hearsay.125  Al-
though Federal Rule of Evidence 801 does not explicitly exclude im-
plied assertions from hearsay, a majority of courts have followed the 
advisory committee’s note to rule 801, and other hearsay treatises, to 
conclude that implied assertions are not hearsay.126  Federal courts 
have held that implied assertions cannot be assertions because the 
declarants do not intend to make the assertions.127  State courts that 
derive their rules of evidence from the Federal Rules of Evidence fol-
low the same pattern.128
As for federal courts, in United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez
 
129 and 
Headley v. Tilghman,130 the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit and the Second Circuit did not find implied assertions 
to be assertions for hearsay purposes.131
 
 124. The advisory committee’s note explains:  
  In both cases the questions of 
unidentified callers were offered to prove the party on the other end 
Admittedly evidence of this character is untested with respect to the percep-
tion, memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor, but the Advi-
sory Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal in the absence of 
an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay 
grounds.  No class of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrication, but the 
likelihood is less likely with nonverbal than with assertive verbal conduct.   
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note.  Id.  Besides sincerity, the other risks of unre-
liability are memory, perception, and narration. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying 
text. 
 125. See supra note 110. 
 126. See infra notes 129–157 and accompanying text. 
 127. See infra notes 129–144 and accompanying text. 
 128. See infra notes 145–157 and accompanying text. 
 129. 565 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 130. 53 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 131. See Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d at 315 (finding that gleaning an inference from a 
statement does not implicate the dangers of hearsay); Headley, 53 F.2d at 477 (finding that 
if a question implies a belief that the declarant is speaking with a drug dealer, the hearsay 
risks are not as intensively implicated as they are in a direct assertion).  But see Park v. Huff, 
493 F.2d 923, 927 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that with an implied assertion, the hearsay dan-
gers are still present and therefore the statement is still hearsay unless there is no possibili-
ty that the declarant intended to leave a particular impression). 
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of the call sold drugs.  In Rodriguez-Lopez, the unidentified callers re-
quested heroin.132  The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the requests were 
not hearsay because they were not assertive speech.133  The speech was 
not assertive because the requests were in the form of questions or 
commands regarding heroin so they could not be proven true or 
false.134
Similarly, in Headley, the callers asked, “Are you up? Can I come 
by? Are you ready?”
 
135  The Second Circuit held these unidentified 
caller’s questions were admissible when offered to prove that another 
party sold drugs because any assertions made were implied and im-
plied assertions do not contain the same risks of insincerity as direct 
assertions.136
Moreover, in United States v. Jackson
 
137 and United States v. Lewis,138 
the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit found implied assertions can-
not be hearsay because the declarant does not intend for an implied 
assertion to be an assertion.  In Jackson, after the police confiscated a 
pager from the defendant, the pager received a message containing a 
phone number.  Police called the number, and an anonymous person 
answered and asked, “Is this Kenny?”139  The court determined that 
the anonymous person’s question may have revealed that the person 
believed Kenny Jackson, the defendant, was in possession of a pager at 
the time and therefore was the person who would have responded to 
a pager message.140  But, the Tenth Circuit found, the question was 
not an assertion because the anonymous person could not have in-
tended to make any assertion.141
 
 132. Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d at 314. 
  Without an assertion, a necessary 
element of hearsay, the question was not hearsay.  Similarly in Lewis, 
the Second Circuit addressed whether an unidentified caller’s ques-
 133. Id.   
 134. Id. 
 135. Headley, 53 F.2d at 477. 
 136. Id. See also United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579–80 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding 
an unidentified caller’s questions about whether “Keith” “still had any stuff” was not hear-
say because any question will likely convey an implied message, and when a declarant does 
not intend to communicate anything, his sincerity is not in question and therefore the in-
ference derived from the statement is more reliable). 
 137. 88 F.3d 845 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 138. 902 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 139. Jackson, 88 F.3d at 846. 
 140. Id. at 848. 
 141. Id.  Indeed, the court found that almost every question would contain an implicit 
message, but it is not hearsay unless the declarant intended to convey that implicit mes-
sage.  Id.  
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tions “[d]id you get the stuff?” and “[w]here is dog?” were hearsay.142  
The questions were offered to prove that the defendant was a drug 
dealer.143  The court focused on intent in finding that the questions 
were not hearsay because they did not contain any assertions.  The 
court determined that the caller did not intend to make an assertion 
that the defendant was a drug dealer.144
In addition to many federal courts, state courts with a hearsay de-
finition identical to the federal definition have determined that hear-
say cannot exist without intent to assert.  In Hernandez v. State,
 
145 for 
example, the Florida District Court of Appeals addressed whether a 
name and address on an envelope was hearsay.146  Florida’s hearsay 
definition mirrors the federal definition of hearsay.147  The facts of 
Hernandez are almost identical to the Maryland case Bernadyn v. State.  
In Hernandez, the State introduced an envelope with the defendant’s 
name and address to prove the defendant lived at the stated ad-
dress.148  The defendant argued that it was hearsay because the person 
who addressed the letter necessarily implied that he or she believed 
the defendant lived at the address.149  The Florida appellate court dis-
agreed and found that the writing of the name and address was not 
intended to “communicate [the] thought, idea, or fact” that Hernan-
dez lived at the address.150  The court stated that any inference that 
the sender believed the defendant lived at the address did not make 
the letter hearsay without some form of intent.151
 
 142. Lewis, 902 F.2d at 1179. 
  Because a declarant 
 143. Id. at 1178–79. 
 144. Id. at 1179.  The court gave little rationale for why the declarant must intend to 
make an assertion.  Instead, it concluded that Rule 801 precluded any other interpretation 
of assertions.  See id. (“However, Rule 801, through its definition of statement, forecloses 
appellants’ argument by removing implied assertions from the coverage of the hearsay 
rule.” (citations omitted)). 
 145. 863 So.2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 146. Id. at 486. 
 147. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801 (West 2011) (“(a) A ‘statement’ is: 1. An oral or writ-
ten assertion; or 2. Nonverbal conduct of a person if it is intended by the person as an as-
sertion.  (b) A ‘declarant’ is a person who makes a statement. (c) ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”). 
 148. Hernandez, 863 So.2d at 486.  Cf. Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 4–5, 887 A.2d 602, 
603–04 (2005) (explaining that officers seized a medical bill from the defendant’s home 
and the State argued the bill showed the defendant lived at the address on the bill). 
 149. Hernandez, 863 So.2d at 486.  Cf. Bernadyn, 390 Md. at 8, 887 A.2d at 606 (explain-
ing that the defendant argued that the addressed bill was hearsay because the sender’s 
conduct was an implied assertion). 
 150. Hernandez, 863 So.2d at 486. 
 151.  See id. (“Conduct, such as placing an address on an envelope, ‘offered as evidence 
that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the existence of the condition 
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must intend to make an assertion for his or her conduct to be an as-
sertion, the court found the letter was not hearsay.152
In State v. Stevens,
  
153 the Court of Appeals of Washington ad-
dressed whether a young girl’s pleas for the defendant to stop were 
hearsay.154  The facts of this case are similar to the Maryland case Stod-
dard v. State.  In Stevens, the girl said, “Arne, stop.  Arne, please don’t,” 
during her sleep.155  The court found that the utterances were not 
hearsay when offered to prove the defendant sexually abused the girl 
because the girl could not have intended to convey that the defen-
dant abused her when she talked during her sleep.  Indeed, she could 
not have intended to make any assertion since she was asleep.156  Be-
cause the court found an assertion must be intended to be hearsay, 
the utterances were not hearsay.157
In sum, although implied assertions were considered assertions 
for the purposes of hearsay at common law, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence changed the outlook on implied assertions.  Most courts elimi-
nated implied assertions from the hearsay definition.  Maryland, how-
ever, has continued to follow common law and include implied 
assertions in its hearsay definition. 
   
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Garner v. State,158
 
sought to be proved’ is not a statement that falls within the hearsay rule.”).  The court in 
Bernadyn found the exact opposite.  See Bernadyn, 390 Md. at 11, 887 A.2d at 608 (“[T]he 
jury needed to reach two conclusions.  It needed to conclude, first, that Bayview Physicians 
wrote those words because it believed Bernadyn to live at that address, and second, that 
Bayview Physicians was accurate in that belief . . . the bill was hearsay . . . .”). 
 the Court of Appeals of Maryland found an 
unidentified caller’s question, “can I get a 40?,” was admissible be-
cause it did not contain the implied assertion the State offered it to 
prove, and further because it was not a direct assertion.  Judge Mur-
 152. Hernandez, 863 So.2d at 486. 
 153. 794 P.2d 38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
 154. Id. at 43. 
 155. Id. Cf. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 683, 887 A.2d 564, 565 (2005) (stating that 
the court was addressing whether a girl’s statement, “Is Erik going to get me?” was hear-
say).  
 156. Stevens, 794 P.2d at 44.  Cf. Stoddard, 389 Md. at 703, 887 A.2d at 577 (concluding 
that a declarant’s lack of intent is irrelevant when determining whether the out-of-court 
utterance was hearsay). 
 157. Stevens, 794 P.2d at 44.  
 158. 414 Md. 372, 995 A.2d 694 (2010). 
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phy, writing for the court,159 began by stating that although Maryland 
law finds certain implied assertions are hearsay, the Maryland 
precedent on implied assertions has not addressed (1) whether a 
“verbal part of an act” is subject to exclusion under hearsay, or (2) 
whether implied assertions reach “every out-of-court declaration that 
constitutes circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s state of 
mind.”160
First, with respect to verbal parts of acts, the court explained that 
under Maryland precedent a telephone call is admissible as non-
hearsay when the call is actually an instrumentality of a crime, such as 
placing bets and, in the present case, requesting drugs.
 
161  For sup-
port, the court reasoned that “[t]elephone calls like the one testified 
by Trooper Gussoni have been held to be admissible in an unbroken 
line of state and federal appellate decisions.”162
 
 159. Judge Adkins, Judge Barbera, Judge Battaglia, and Judge Greene joined Judge 
Murphy in the majority opinion.  Judge Harrell joined the majority as to Part II, dealing 
with an issue not discussed in this Note. 
  The court found that 
 160. 414 Md. at 381, 995 A.2d.at 699.  A verbal part of an act explains or gives character 
to a transaction that might otherwise be ambiguous.  E.g., Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 
13, 536 A.2d 666, 671–72 (1987) (citation omitted).  Courts find verbal parts of acts are 
admissible non-hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted in 
the out-of-court utterance; whether what the declarant said is true or false is irrelevant if 
the utterance is a verbal part of an act.  Id. at 9 n.4, 536 A.2d at 670 n.4 (citing Moore v. 
State, 26 Md. App. 556, 560 n.1, 338 A.2d 344, 346 n.1 (1975)).  
 161. Garner, 414 Md. at 382–84, 995 A.2d at 700–01.  The court stated “[t]he making of 
a wager or the purchase of a drug, legally or illegally, is a form of a contract.”  Id. at 382, 
995 A.2d at 700 (citation omitted).  The court used several cases to support its contention 
that drug requests were verbal acts.  First, the court cited Baum v. State, 163 Md. 153, 161 A. 
244 (1932), where the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the words uttered when a 
police officer called the defendant’s residence and placed a bet were admissible because 
they were offered to show that a bet could be made at that residence.  Garner, 414 Md. at 
382–83, 995 A.2d at 700.  The court also cited Courtney v. State, 187 Md. 1, 48 A.2d 430 
(1946).  There, an officer was searching a location, answered a telephone call, and the 
caller placed a bet.  The court found the words admissible to show the defendant received 
bets at the premises.  Garner, 414 Md. at 383–84, 995 A.2d at 700–01.  Finally, the court 
cited Little v. State, 204 Md. 518, 105 A.2d 501 (1954), where the court found the words “I 
got it up” were admissible to show that a bet was taken on the premises.  Garner, 414 Md. at 
383–84, 995 A.2d at 701.  Although the Garner court uses the phrases “verbal parts of acts” 
and “verbal acts” interchangeably, many commentators describe them as two different 
concepts.  Compare MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, §§ 801.7–801.8 (West 2001) (defining 
verbal act as words necessary to create certain elements of legal claims, and defining verbal 
parts of acts as words that give character to an otherwise ambiguous act), with Garner, 414 
Md. at 382–83, 995 A.2d at 700 (finding that bet request and drug request phone calls 
were verbal acts because these calls are part of an offer in a contract while also finding that 
bet request and drug request phone calls were verbal acts because they characterized an 
action), and id. at 381, 388, 995 A.2d at 699, 704 (identifying the out-of-court utterance, 
“can I get a 40?,” as a verbal part of an act and as a verbal act).  
 162. Garner, 414 Md. at 384, 995 A.2d at 701.  The court acknowledged that some feder-
al courts exclude the evidence because the evidence is offered as an “implied assertion” 
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although commentators disagree about why courts admit the calls, 
commentators believe the calls are admissible nonetheless.163
Second, the court, addressing implied assertions, considered 
another line of cases that held calls, such as the one in the present 
case, were admissible because the declarant asked a question and 
therefore did not intend to make an assertion.
   
164
Turning to the current case, the Court of Appeals found that 
even though any question can contain an implied assertion, the ques-
tion “can I get a 40?” only contained the implied assertion “that the 
caller had the funds to purchase the drugs that he wanted to pur-
chase.”
  The court cited ju-
risdictions that held utterances cannot be assertions unless the decla-
rant intended to assert what the proponent is offering the assertion to 
prove.  In other words, the courts found that without intent to assert, 
an out-of-court utterance cannot be hearsay. 
165  Further, the court concluded that the question was a “ver-
bal act” because it established that Garner possessed a cell phone that 
a drug buyer called.166  As such, the unidentified caller’s question was 
not excluded by the hearsay rule.167
In dissent, Chief Judge Bell opined that the out-of-court utter-
ance “can I get a 40?” was, in fact, hearsay under Maryland 
precedent.
 
168
 
and those courts find that implied assertions are non-hearsay under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  See id. at 382 n.3, 995 A.2d at 701 n.3. 
  Chief Judge Bell contended that the majority’s reason-
ing was illogical because although the majority acknowledged that (a) 
 163. Id. at 384–86, 995 A.2d at 701–02 (citations omitted).  Interestingly, the court cited 
Professor Graham, who argues that although some consider drug calls and bet calls as ver-
bal acts, they are actually offered for the implied assertion that the declarant believed the 
establishment sold drugs or took bets.  Id. at 385–86, 995 A.2d at 702 (quoting MICHAEL H. 
GRAHAM, EVIDENCE, AN INTRODUCTORY PROBLEM APPROACH 81 (2002)).    
 164. Id. at 386–88, 995 A.2d at 702–04.  The court cited United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 
1176 (5th Cir. 1990), where the Fifth Circuit found the words “did you get the stuff” and 
“where is dog” were non-hearsay when offered to prove the defendant sold drugs because 
a declarant does not intend to assert anything with a question.  Garner, 414 Md. at 386–87, 
995 A.2d at 702–03 (citation omitted).  The court also cited United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 
565 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2009), where the Sixth Circuit found ten requests to purchase he-
roin over the phone were admissible because questions and commands are not assertions.  
Garner, 414 Md. at 387–88, 995 A.2d at 703–04. (citing Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d at 314–15 
(citing United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] question is typically 
not hearsay because it does not assert the truth or falsity of a fact.”))); see also United States 
v. Thomas, 451 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Questions and commands generally are not 
intended assertions, and therefore cannot constitute hearsay.”) (citations omitted)). 
 165. Garner, 414 Md. at 388, 995 A.2d at 704. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.   
 168. Id. at 406–14, 995 A.2d at 714–19 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).  Judge Harrell joined 
Chief Judge Bell as to Part I of the dissent, discussing implied assertions. 
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under Maryland precedent an implied assertion is hearsay and (b) the 
question at issue contained an implied assertion, the majority arbitra-
rily found that the out-of-court question impliedly asserted only that 
the declarant had the funds to purchase the drugs that he wanted but 
not that Garner was a drug dealer. 169  Thus, according to Chief Judge 
Bell, the majority ignored the common law definition of assertion dis-
cussed in Stoddard and Bernadyn, which would have required the court 
to find “can I get a 40?” to be inadmissible hearsay.170
In addition to rejecting the majority’s finding that the out-of-
court utterance was a verbal act,
 
171 Chief Judge Bell found the ano-
nymous caller’s question fell squarely within the definition of asser-
tion under Maryland precedent.172  To come to this conclusion, he 
first explained that an implied assertion is considered hearsay when 
the implied assertion is only relevant if the declarant revealed, by im-
plication, that he or she believed in the implied assertion.173  To ex-
plain this rule, Chief Judge Bell discussed the utterances in Stoddard 
and Bernadyn and found no difference between the utterances in 
those cases and the utterance in the instant case.  In this case, the 
State offered the unidentified caller’s question to show Garner was a 
drug dealer.  But, according to Chief Judge Bell, “can I get a 40?” only 
connects Garner to the crime—intent to distribute cocaine—if first, 
the caller believed that the owner of the cell phone sold cocaine, and 
second, if the declarant’s belief is true.174
 
 169. Id. at 396–97, 995 A.2d at 708–09.  
  “[I]f the declarant, the call-
er, did not believe those two assumptions to be true, then the State 
would have no reason to introduce the statement; the statement, in 
that event, as it relates to the petitioner, simply would be neither 
 170. Id. at 397, 995 A.2d at 709. 
 171. See id. at 399–406, 995 A.2d at 710–14 (arguing that a verbal act describes actions of 
an individual and in this case, the words did not describe any action of the defendant).   
 172. See id. at 414, 995 A.2d at 719 (explaining that the state used the utterance to prove 
an assertion implied in the utterance). 
 173. Id. at 406, 995 A.2d at 714 (citing Stoddard v. State 389 Md. 681, 689, 887 A.2d 564, 
569 (2005)). 
 174. Id. at 413–14, 995 A.2d at 718–19.  As stated, Chief Judge Bell compared the 
present utterance with Maryland precedent.  See Stoddard, 389 Md. at 690, 887 A.2d at 569 
(finding the utterance “is Erik going to get me?” was only relevant if the declarant had a 
reason to fear Erik and that reason was that the declarant saw Erik assault a specific per-
son); Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 11, 887 A.2d 602, 608 (2005) (finding an envelope 
containing a name and an address was only relevant if first, the addresser of the envelope 
believed the named person lived at the named address, and second, that the belief was 
true). Applying the reasoning of Stoddard and Bernadyn, if the caller did not believe that 
Garner was the owner of the phone and that he sold cocaine, then his or her question 
would not be relevant.  Garner, 414 Md. at 413–14, 995 A.2d at 718–19. 
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probative nor relevant.”175  As such, Chief Judge Bell determined that 
the question contained an implied assertion that the State offered for 
its truth and therefore the question was inadmissible hearsay under 
Maryland Rule 5-801.176
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
In Garner v. State, the Court of Appeals held an unidentified call-
er’s utterance, “can I get a 40?,” was not hearsay in part because it did 
not contain the implied assertion the State offered it to prove.177  In 
so holding, the court failed to properly apply its definition of implied 
assertion.178  Instead, the court implicitly applied the federal hearsay 
definition, which excludes implied assertions.179  This holding will 
cause litigants to make inconsistent arguments, judges to make arbi-
trary rulings, and appellate courts to apply unpredictable standards.180  
The court should have expressly overturned its precedent in Stoddard 
v. State and Bernadyn v. State and adopted the federal definition of 
hearsay—excluding implied assertions—to avoid unpredictability in 
the application of implied assertion admissibility standards and to 
prevent the concept of implied assertions from converting every out-
of-court utterance into hearsay.181
A.  The Court of Appeals Failed to Apply Its Precedent Regarding Implied 
Assertions 
  
Under Maryland precedent, “where the probative value of words, 
as offered, depends on the declarant having communicated a factual 
proposition, the words constitute an ‘assertion’ of that proposition.”182
 
 175. Garner, 414 Md. at 414, 995 A.2d at 719. 
  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 388, 995 A.2d at 704 (majority opinion).  The proponent of the out-of-court 
utterance offered it to prove that Garner was a drug dealer because the declarant believed 
he was a drug dealer.  Id. at 376, 995 A.2d at 696.  The court determined that the out-of-
court utterance only contained the implied assertion that the declarant wanted to pur-
chase drugs and had the funds to do so.  Id. at 388, 995 A.2d at 704. 
 178. See infra Part IV.A. 
 179. See infra Part IV.B. 
 180. See infra Part IV.B. 
 181. See infra Part IV.C. 
 182. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 703, 887 A.2d 564, 577 (2005).  This is a typical im-
plied assertion definition.  See, e.g., Ted Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms 
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 682–83 (1962) (defining implied asser-
tion as verbal or nonverbal conduct that does not expressly assert the matter it is offered to 
prove but the conduct implies that the action belies such an assertion); James M. Ulam, 
Note, The Hearsay Rule: Are Telephone Calls Intercepted by Police Admissible to Prove the Truth of 
Matters Impliedly Asserted?, 11 MISS. C. L. REV. 349, 352 (1991) (“An out-of-court statement is 
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By finding the unidentified caller’s question contained an assertion 
that it was not offered to prove, the Garner court ignored its own 
precedent.  In so doing, the court incorrectly admitted the unidenti-
fied caller’s question. 
In determining that the question, “can I get a 40?,” was not hear-
say, the Court of Appeals found “the only assertion implied in the 
anonymous caller’s question was the assertion that the caller had the 
funds to purchase the drugs that he wanted to purchase.”183  This 
analysis necessarily begins with identifying the implied assertions that 
the court believes exists in a statement and then asking whether the 
statement was offered to prove those implied assertions.  In contrast, 
precedent directs the court to start with determining what the utter-
ance was offered to prove and then ask whether what it was offered to 
prove was a factual proposition the declarant had to have impliedly 
communicated with his or her words.184
Had the court applied the traditional Maryland definition of im-
plied assertion, it would have found the State offered the out-of-court 
question to prove the truth of an implied assertion.  The State offered 
the unidentified caller’s question to show that Garner was a drug 
dealer, not merely a drug user.
  The Court of Appeals did not 
attempt to analyze the statement under Maryland’s implied assertion 
definition when it determined that the unidentified caller’s question 
was not hearsay. 
185
 
an implied assertion if the trier [of fact] is being asked to infer a fact from the declarant’s 
utterance.”). 
  The question offered only tends to 
show that Garner was a drug dealer if the caller believed Garner sold 
 183. Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372, 388, 995 A.2d 694, 704 (2010). 
 184. See Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 11 & n.4, 887 A.2d 602, 608 & n.4 (2005) (stress-
ing that whether an out-of-court utterance contained an implied assertion depends on 
what the proponent offers the evidence to prove).  Maryland’s approach to implied asser-
tions is the same as the approach of other courts that find implied assertions are hearsay.  
Accord, e.g., State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 595 (Iowa 2003) (“We think the best ap-
proach is to evaluate the relevant assertion in the context of the purpose for which the 
evidence is offered.”) (citation omitted); Mosley v. State, 141 S.W.3d 816, 830 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2004) (“‘[T]ruth of the matter asserted’ includes any matter explicitly asserted, but 
also includes within hearsay any matter implied by a statement, if the probative value of 
the statement as offered flows from the declarant's belief as to the matter.” (emphasis add-
ed) (citation omitted)). 
 185. See Garner v. State, 183 Md. App. 122, 135, 960 A.2d 646, 656 (2008), aff’d, 414 Md. 
372, 995 A.2d 684 (2010) (quoting the State to show it argued that the caller would not 
have called Garner and asked for a 40 if Garner was not a drug dealer); see also Garner, 414 
Md. at 414, 995 A.2d at 719 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the State introduced the 
statement for a particular purpose: to establish that the person on the phone wanted co-
caine, which could be purchased upon request from the defendant, who sold drugs). 
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drugs.186  If the caller did not believe Garner sold drugs—for example 
if the caller had the wrong number, was telling a joke, or was asking 
for a forty of something other than drugs—then the question would 
not tend to show that Garner was a drug dealer.187
In fact, one frequent commentator on the Maryland Rules of 
Evidence, Lynn McLain, used this type of question as an example of 
an utterance that would be inadmissible as an implied assertion.
  Thus, the proba-
tive value of the question—showing that Garner was a drug dealer—
depends on whether the declarant asked “can I get a 40?” because he 
believed Garner to be a drug dealer.   
188  
Among McLain’s list of inadmissible implied assertions is “did you get 
the stuff?” when offered to prove the defendant was a drug dealer.189
B.  Because the Court of Appeals Applied the Federal Definition of 
Assertion, Which Excluded Implied Assertions from Hearsay, It Has 
Created Contradictory Precedent 
  
There is little difference between the example “did you get the stuff?” 
and the actual question in Garner (“can I get a 40?”).  In Garner, the 
question was offered to prove an implied assertion and, in accordance 
with Maryland precedent, was hearsay. 
In Garner, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the un-
identified caller’s question did not contain the implied assertion it 
was offered to prove.190  In so holding, the court did not rely on its 
precedent.191  Instead, the court cited many federal cases that have 
found implied assertions are not hearsay.192
 
 186. Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding the 
statement “I didn’t tell them anything about you” only tended to show that the defendant 
participated in the crime if the declarant was making the statement because he knew the 
defendant participated in the crime). 
  The theory of implied as-
sertions the court relied on is the polar opposite of its own precedent.  
Two schools of thought exist for dealing with implied assertions.  One 
school, which this Note will call school A, is the common law thinking 
that implied assertions can be hearsay when the relevance of the dec-
larant’s utterance depends on the declarant communicating the im-
 187. Cf. id. at 103 (finding that if the declarant of “I didn’t tell them anything about 
you” did not believe the defendant was involved in a crime, but made the statement be-
cause he actually believed there was nothing to tell, then the statement would not have 
been relevant). 
 188. LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 193 (West Group 2d ed. 2002). 
 189. Id.  
 190. Garner, 414 at 388, 995 A.2d at 704. 
 191. See supra Part IV.A. 
 192. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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plied assertion.  The second school, which this Note will call school B, 
follows the federal rules advisory committee’s note that the declarant 
must have an intent to assert for any assertion to be considered hear-
say, which excludes implied assertions because they do not involve in-
tent.193  Maryland is part of school A, but the Garner court cited to cas-
es from courts that are part of school B to find that the unidentified 
caller’s question was not hearsay.  As such, although the Court of Ap-
peals stated that it was analyzing the unidentified caller’s question 
under Maryland’s hearsay definition, it in fact assessed the question 
under the federal standard.194
The court did not explicitly overrule its precedent, however, and 
thus created an incoherent definition of implied assertions.  In fact, 
the court’s former implied assertion cases would not be implied asser-
tions under its Garner analysis.
   
195
1.  The Court Followed the Federal Definition of Hearsay in Finding 
the Unidentified Caller’s Question Was Not Hearsay 
  This ambiguity in the realm of hear-
say will create a guessing game among trial judges and litigants, and 
will cause appellate court judges to make ad hoc decisions regarding 
hearsay statements. 
The Garner court relied on federal court rulings that a declarant 
must intend to make an assertion for any utterance to be an assertion.  
For example, the court cited United States v. Lewis, in which the Fifth 
Circuit found the questions “[d]id you get the stuff?” and “[w]here is 
dog?” were not hearsay because the caller did not intend to make an 
assertion.196
In Headley v. Tilghman,
   
197
 
 193. Compare Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 703, 887 A.2d 564, 577 (2005) (“[W]here 
the probative value of words, as offered, depends on the declarant having communicated a 
factual proposition, the words constitute an ‘assertion’ of that proposition.”), with FED. R. 
EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s note (“The key to the definition [of a statement] is that 
nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one.”). 
 another case relied on by the Court of 
Appeals, the Second Circuit held that the questions “[a]re you up? 
[c]an I come by? [a]re you ready?” were not hearsay because the as-
sertion that the party on the other line sold drugs was an implied as-
 194. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 195. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 196. 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1990).  In fact, the court actually rejected the argu-
ment that the words contained an implied assertion because the implied assertions are not 
part of the federal definition of hearsay.  Id. 
 197. 53 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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sertion and therefore not hearsay.198  The court also relied on Rodri-
guez-Lopez, where the Sixth Circuit found that an unidentified caller’s 
questions asking for heroin were not hearsay because they were not 
assertive speech.199
The Garner court also relied on commentators to support its 
holding.
  By suggesting that these cases supported its ulti-
mate finding regarding implied assertions, the Garner court articu-
lated an unspoken retreat from the common law theory of implied as-
sertions. 
200  At least one of these commentators, however, does not 
support the court’s conclusion.  Professor Graham reasons that state-
ments where the declarant takes bets can sometimes fall into the resi-
dual hearsay exception.201  Professor Graham argues that calls such as 
the one in Garner are hearsay because they are relevant only when of-
fered to prove the truth of the matter implicitly being asserted by the 
out-of-court declarant.202  As an example, Professor Graham explains 
that if a caller places bets over the phone, that conversation is only re-
levant if the caller believed he was calling a betting parlor.203  He criti-
cizes those who find such calls are not being offered for their truth 
and states that the calls clearly fall into the definition of hearsay.204
The court’s reliance on federal cases was not relevant to Mary-
land’s standard for whether a statement containing an implied asser-
tion is hearsay.  Maryland’s definition depends on whether the decla-
rant of an out-of-court utterance believed a fact implied in his or her 
  
Thus, although Professor Graham may have found that the utterance 
could fall into a hearsay exception, his finding does not support the 
conclusion that implied assertions are not hearsay—the conclusion 
the Garner court implies by in part relying on Professor Graham’s 
work. 
 
 198. Id. at 477.  Instead, the court claimed the utterances were circumstantial evidence 
of the speaker’s belief.  Id. 
 199. 565 F.3d 312, 314–15 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 200. Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372, 384–86, 995 A.2d 694, 701–02 (2010). 
 201. See GRAHAM, supra note 163, at 81 (“As presented such statements also fall within 
the residual hearsay exception of Rule 807.”). 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Id; see also 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.7, at 73–
74 (5th ed. 2001) (“The Advisory Committee’s apparent attempted rejection of Wright v. 
Doe d. Tatham is as unfortunate as it is incorrect. When a statement is offered to infer the 
declarant's state of mind from which a given fact is inferred in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, since the truth of the matter asserted must be assumed in order for the nonas-
serted inference to be drawn, the statement is properly classified as hearsay under the lan-
guage of Rule 801(c).” (footnotes omitted)). 
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statement.205  The school of thought based on the Federal Advisory 
Committee’s Note asks solely if the declarant intended to make an as-
sertion.206
2. The Garner Court’s Reasoning Would Overrule Its Previous 
Implied Assertion Decisions 
  Because the Garner court relied on the latter standard 
while purporting to apply the Maryland standard, the current state of 
Maryland’s implied assertion definition is unknown.   
In relying on whether the declarant intended to make an asser-
tion and finding that the only implied assertion present in the un-
identified caller’s statement was that the caller wanted drugs and had 
the money to pay for them, the Court of Appeals ignored its own 
precedent.  Indeed, if the analysis in Garner were applied to Mary-
land’s previous cases that addressed implied assertions, the statements 
in those cases would not have been labeled hearsay.   
For example, in Stoddard v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
found that a girl’s utterance “is Erik going to get me?” was hearsay be-
cause it was only relevant if the girl impliedly asserted that she saw 
Stoddard harm another person and because the assertion was un-
tested as to whether the girl was sincere and whether she meant what 
the State claimed she meant.207  Had the court applied the analysis it 
applied in Garner, where it determined that the only implied assertion 
in the unidentified caller’s question was that he wanted to and had 
the money to purchase drugs, it could have simply found that the only 
implied assertions in the utterance “is Erik going to get me?” are, for 
instance, that the declarant is scared of Stoddard and wants to be kept 
away from him.208  Using the Garner court’s reasoning, the court could 
have found that the girl did not intend to assert that she saw Stoddard 
harm another person,209
Similarly, the Maryland court’s holding in Bernadyn v. State would 
not stand under the federal standard for hearsay.  In Bernadyn, the 
court found that a letter addressed to the defendant was hearsay be-
cause it was only relevant if the addresser believed the defendant lived 
 and so the utterance was not hearsay.   
 
 205. See supra Part II.C. 
 206. See supra Part II.B. 
 207. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 711–12, 887 A.2d 564, 582 (2005). 
 208. Cf. Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372, 388, 995 A.2d 694, 704 (2010) (finding that the 
out-of-court utterance only contained certain implied assertions). 
 209. Cf. id. at 387, 995 A.2d at 703 (finding that the unknown caller’s question was not 
an assertion after citing a case that found questions are not assertions because the decla-
rant of a question does not intend to make an assertion). 
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at the written address.210
Further, like Garner’s finding that the caller only impliedly as-
serted that he wanted to purchase drugs and had the money to do so, 
the addresser in Bernadyn could have been said to have only impliedly 
asserted that he wanted the defendant to receive the letter or merely 
that he was instructed to address a standard form letter.  As shown 
through analyzing Bernadyn and Stoddard under the Garner court’s rea-
soning, the Court of Appeals has abandoned its previous standard for 
determining whether an assertion is hearsay. 
  Had the court employed the federal stan-
dard for defining assertion, as it did in Garner, the court could have 
held that the addresser did not intend to assert that he believed the 
defendant lived at the stated address, and therefore the addressed let-
ter was not hearsay.   
3.  The Garner Court Holding Will Create Difficulty for Litigants, 
Trial Court Judges, and Appellate Court Judges 
Lawyers and judges must address the question of hearsay during 
trials.  Trials require quick, persuasive arguments and even faster de-
cisions on the admissibility of evidence.  As such, rules of evidence 
have little value unless lawyers and judges can understand and apply 
them with relative ease.211
Trial judges may end up applying Maryland’s hearsay law arbitra-
rily.  Maryland trial court judges, who have to make quick rulings dur-
ing trial, need a clear rule to properly decide whether an utterance 
contains an assertion, expressed or implied, and whether implied as-
sertions contain the dangers of hearsay and therefore should be with-
held from the trier of fact.
  Without a clear definition of implied asser-
tions, litigators will understandably make inconsistent arguments.  
Based on the holding in Garner, litigators must prepare to argue that 
implied assertions are hearsay under Maryland law, but that a decla-
rant must intend to make an assertion for it to be hearsay.  Because 
the declarant does not typically intend to make an implied assertion, 
litigators are being asked to make illogical arguments. 
212
 
 210. Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 14, 887 A.2d 602, 609 (2005). 
  In breaking its consistent use of the 
common law definition of assertion, the Court of Appeals has left 
lower courts unable to quickly determine whether a particular asser-
tion is hearsay. 
 211. Finman, supra note 182, at 695. 
 212. Cf. Alan D. Hornstein & Nichole G. Mazade, A Match Made in Maryland: Howard 
Chasanow and the Law of Evidence, 60 MD. L. REV. 315, 370 (2001) (discussing how it is al-
most impossible to run an error-free trial because objections and rulings come “too thick 
and fast”). 
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Finally, appellate courts will be at a loss for what standard to ap-
ply when deciding whether an utterance was offered for an implied 
assertion and, if so, whether it is hearsay.  This became apparent in 
Fair v. State,213 decided in March 2011, in which the Court of Special 
Appeals once again confronted implied assertions.  The court consi-
dered whether the date on a paycheck was hearsay.214  The court 
stated that to follow the Garner precedent, it needed to look to wheth-
er the paycheck contained any relevant implied assertions.215  The 
court decided that the only assertions the paycheck implied were that 
the city owed, or believed it owed, a named employee wages for a pe-
riod worked, and that the Payroll Division had, or believed it had, the 
funds in its account to cover the check for those wages.216  After de-
termining what implied assertions were contained in the paycheck, 
the court indicated that because the paycheck was not offered to 
prove the truth of any of these implied assertions, the paycheck was 
not hearsay.217
This holding does not follow the common law standard for im-
plied assertions, which requires the court to look at the probative val-
ue of the statement (what the proponent offered the statement to 
prove).
 
218  Instead the court goes backward, as the Garner court did, 
and merely states some implied assertions that could be present in the 
statement and then dismisses them because the proponent of the 
paycheck did not offer the paycheck to prove those implied asser-
tions.219
C.  The Court of Appeals Should Have Acknowledged Its Adoption of the 
Federal Definition of Hearsay to Stop the Unpredictability in the 
Application of Implied Assertion Admissibility Standards and to 
  This case demonstrates the Court of Appeals has created 
conflicting precedent that will necessarily cause inconsistent argu-
ments by litigants, arbitrary rulings by trial judges, and unsound hold-
ings by appellate judges. 
 
 213. 198 Md. App. 1, 16 A.3d 211 (2011). 
 214. Id. at 13, 16 A.3d at 218.  The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s Central Pay-
roll Division issued the check to the appellant.  Id.  The pay period was June 18, 2007, 
through June 24, 2007.  Id. at 7, 16 A.3d at 214. 
 215. See id. at 38, 16 A.3d at 232 (“[W]e recognize that the Garner Court also considered 
whether, by its question, the anonymous caller made an implied assertion.”). 
 216. Id.  
 217. Id., 16 A.3d at 232–33. 
 218. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (stating Maryland’s standard for deter-
mining whether a statement contains an implied assertion that is offered for its truth). 
 219. Cf. supra notes 183–184 and accompanying text. 
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Prevent Implied Assertions from Eventually Swallowing the Hearsay 
Rule 
After the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a majority of 
federal and state courts moved into a school of thought that implied 
assertions are no longer hearsay.220  Although Maryland claims to con-
tinue to hold implied assertions are hearsay, it has implicitly adopted 
the majority rule.221  To stop the inconsistent interpretation of the 
term assertion, the Court of Appeals should have acknowledged this 
adoption222 because a narrower definition of assertion provides a clear 
rule and prevents the concept of implied assertions from swallowing 
the hearsay rule.223
1.  To Avoid Inconsistent Interpretations of What Constitutes an 
Implied Assertion, the Court of Appeals Should Have Formally 
Found That Implied Assertions Were No Longer Hearsay 
 
Even though the Maryland Court of Appeals claimed that im-
plied assertions fell under the ambit of hearsay in Stoddard v. State and 
Bernadyn v. State,224 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals immediate-
ly struggled to interpret the scope of implied assertions in Fields v. 
State.225  Further, in declining to address the issue when the opportu-
nity arose in Fields, the Court of Appeals seems to have acknowledged 
the difficulty in determining when an utterance contains an implied 
assertion and if that assertion is hearsay.226  To avoid perpetuating this 
confusion, the Garner court should have formally adopted the federal 
definition of assertion—eliminating implied assertions from hear-
say—to create a workable standard for assertion that does not invite 
unpredictable application.227
 
 220. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 
 221. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 222. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 223. See intra Part IV.C.2. 
 224. See Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 703, 887 A.2d 565, 577 (2005) (finding that an 
implied assertion is not excluded from the hearsay rule); Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 11, 
887 A.2d 602, 608 (2005) (affirming and applying the Stoddard court’s hearsay definition). 
 225. 168 Md. App. 22, 36, 895 A.2d 339, 347 (2006), aff’d, 395 Md. 758, 912 A.2d 637 
(2006) (creating a distinction between an implied assertion and using words as circums-
tantial evidence). 
 226. See Fields v. State, 395 Md. 758, 764, 912 A.2d 637, 640 (2006) (deciding not to ad-
dress whether the name on the bowling alley screen was an implied assertion because any 
error finding that it was not an implied assertion was “most certainly” harmless). 
 227. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s note (explaining that utterances are 
only assertions if the declarant intended to make an assertion); see also supra Part II.C. 
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Despite that many federal and state courts have found that im-
plied assertions are no longer hearsay after the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence,228
We conclude that … out-of-court words offered for the truth 
of unintentional implications are not different substantially 
from out-of-court words offered for the truth of intentional 
communications.  The declarant’s lack of intent to commu-
nicate the implied proposition does not increase the reliabil-
ity of the declarant’s words in a degree sufficient to justify 
exemption from the hearsay rule.
 the Maryland court held steadfastly to im-
plied assertions.  In Stoddard v. State, the Court of Appeals stated:  
229
In Bernadyn v. State, the Court of Appeals affirmed Stoddard and held 
that if the proponent of evidence offers it to prove something the dec-
larant had to believe, but did not actually assert, then the statement is 
hearsay.
 
230
Courts immediately applied the holdings in Stoddard and Ber-
nadyn unpredictably.  Indeed, less than a year after Bernadyn, in Fields 
v. State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, purporting to apply 
Stoddard and Bernadyn, determined that although the probative value 
of an out-of-court written name depended on whether it showed the 
defendant was present at the location where someone wrote the de-
fendant’s name, it was not hearsay.
   
231  According to the court, the 
name was merely circumstantial evidence of the implied fact.232  Al-
though the Court of Appeals granted certiorari for a second time, it 
decided not to decide the issue and instead found the error was 
harmless.233
The confusion continued four years later, in the lower court de-
cision in Garner v. State.  There, the Court of Special Appeals stated 
that the Court of Appeals’ failure to address the implied assertion in 
Fields was a sign that the Court of Appeals did not wish to extend Stod-
dard and Bernadyn beyond their literal holdings.
  This arguably reveals the Court of Appeals’ uneasiness 
regarding implied assertions. 
234
 
 228. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Jackson, 88 F.3d 845, 848 (10th Cir. 1996); Hernandez v. State, 863 So.2d 484, 486 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Stevens, 794 P.2d 38, 44 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
  The court stated 
 229. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 703, 887 A.2d 564, 577 (2005). 
 230. Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 11 887 A.2d 602, 608 (2005). 
 231. Fields v. State, 168 Md. App. 22, 38, 895 A.2d 339, 348 (2006). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Fields v. State, 395 Md. 758, 764, 912 A.2d 637, 640 (2006). 
 234. Garner v. State, 183 Md. App. 122, 150, 960 A.2d 649, 665 (2008), aff’d, 414 Md. 
372, 995 A.2d 684 (2010) (“We would have to be blind not to conclude that something was 
in ferment behind the scenes; and that it was something other than a ringing endorsement 
LanzendorferFinalBookProof 3/14/2012  12:27 PM 
2012] GARNER v. STATE 649 
that an expansionist tide produced those two opinions.  And further, 
the court stated that it had to “read the tea leaves” to determine 
whether the out-of-court question at hand was hearsay.235  Turning 
away from the decision in Stoddard and Bernadyn, the Court of Special 
Appeals found the question, “can I get a 40?,” was not hearsay, in part, 
by relying on courts that followed the school of thought that excludes 
implied assertions from hearsay.236
Finally, now that the Court of Appeals has decided Garner, the 
unpredictability continues.  In Fair v. State, decided less than a year 
after Garner, the Court of Special Appeals did not address intent of 
the declarant or even discuss the probative value of an out-of-court 
paycheck or what the proponent offered it to prove, merely finding 
that the paycheck contained two implied assertions but was not hear-
say because it was not offered to prove those assertions.
 
237
The Maryland courts’ different explanations of implied asser-
tions over the last seven years cannot be reconciled.  These inconsis-
tencies will continue until the Court of Appeals provides a clear stan-
dard for determining whether an implied assertion is hearsay. 
  
2.  Excluding Implied Assertions from Hearsay Would Have Ensured 
That the Trier of Fact Accounted for Reliable Evidence and Every 
Out-of-Court Utterance Could Not Be Deemed an Implied 
Assertion 
Instead of trying to arbitrarily limit the scope of implied asser-
tions, the Garner court should have held that implied assertions were 
no longer hearsay under Maryland law.  Such a holding would have 
solved the many problems inherent in finding implied assertions can 
be hearsay.  Finding that implied assertions offered for their truth are 
hearsay severely restricts the information available to the trier of 
fact.238
 
of Stoddard and Bernadyn.  Perhaps the energy that fueled the Stoddard and Bernadyn deci-
sions a year ago has to some greater or lesser extent cooled.”). 
  Further, an objective line cannot be drawn between an out-of-
court utterance that contains the implied assertion it was offered to 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 136–45, 960 A.2d at 656–63.  The court cited several cases, e.g., United States 
v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579–80 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that an unidentified caller’s 
question regarding drugs was not hearsay because the caller did not intend to make an 
assertion); United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1990) (same). 
 237. 198 Md. App. 1, 38, 16 A.3d 211, 232 (2011).  Cf. Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 10–
11, 887 A.2d 602, 607–08 (2005) (explaining that an utterance is hearsay if the probative 
value of the utterance is an assertion present in the utterance and applying that logic to 
specific facts). 
 238. See infra Part IV.C.2.a. 
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prove and one that does not.  If no line can be drawn, then implied 
assertions could ultimately encompass all out-of-court statements.239
a.  The Trier of Fact Should Be Able to Consider Implied Assertions  
   
The trier of fact should be able to consider implied assertions 
because they are more reliable than hearsay and do not contain the 
same risks as hearsay.  To be fully informed, the trier of fact must have 
liberal access to all reliable evidence.240  As such, courts should only 
exclude out-of-court statements if they pose all four risks of unreliabil-
ity: memory, perception, narration, and sincerity.241  Implied asser-
tions do not pose the last risk, sincerity, because a declarant cannot 
fabricate a statement he did not intend to make. 242  For this reason, 
many courts find implied assertions to be more reliable than express 
assertions.243  As one scholar has stated, “In the case of non-assertive 
acts, the actor by definition does not intend to make an assertion, 
meaning that the risk of insincerity is substantially diminished.  The 
actor is at least not trying to lie.”244
For example, in Garner the State offered the question “can I get a 
40?” to prove that the defendant sold drugs.
 
245
 
 239. See infra Part IV.C.2.b. 
  The caller who made 
that statement could not have fabricated the statement that the de-
 240. MD. R. 5-102 (“The rules in this Title shall be construed to secure fairness in ad-
ministration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the growth and de-
velopment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and pro-
ceedings justly determined.”). 
 241.  See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994).  See also MD. R. 5-801(c) 
(“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the tri-
al or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”). 
 242. Paul Kirgis, Meaning, Intention, and the Hearsay Rule, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 275, 
285 (2001) (“[E]vidence that does not implicate the sincerity of an out-of-court declarant 
is not hearsay.”).  But see Paul R. Rice, Should Unintended Implications of Speech Be Considered 
Hearsay? The Assertive/Nonassertive Distinction Under Rule 801(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
65 TEMP. L. REV. 529, 534 (1992) (“It is illogical to conclude that the question of sincerity is 
eliminated and that the problem of unreliability is reduced for unintended implications of 
speech if that speech might have been insincere in the first instance, relative to the direct 
message intentionally communicated.”). 
 243. See, e.g., Headley v. Tilghman 53 F.3d 472, 477 (2d Cir. 1995) (“An assumption has 
a fair claim to be treated as non-hearsay since the attendant risks are not as intensively im-
plicated as when the idea is directly enunciated in a statement.”); United States v. Long, 
905 F.2d 1572, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“When a declarant does not intend to communicate 
anything, however, his sincerity is not in question and the need for cross-examination is 
sharply diminished. Thus, an unintentional message is presumptively more reliable.”). 
 244. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES 
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.02[1][c] at 801–15 (9th ed. 2006).  
 245. Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372, 376, 995 A.2d 694, 696–97 (2010). 
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fendant sold drugs because he never made that statement.246
b.  The Concept of Implied Assertions Could Swallow the Hearsay 
Rule 
  Because 
little risk of insincerity exists in this type of situation, and because the 
trier of fact needs to have liberal access to reliable evidence, the trier 
of fact should be able to consider implied assertions as evidence. 
In addition to ensuring the trier of fact could consider relevant 
and reliable evidence, the Court of Appeals also should have explicitly 
excluded implied assertions from hearsay because there is no way to 
stop the concept from encompassing all out-of-court utterances.247  
The Court of Appeals even pointed out the ability of the concept of 
implied assertion to swallow the hearsay rule in Garner.248  Yet, under 
Maryland precedent, a court is supposed to find that an utterance or 
other act is hearsay if an assertion, however attenuated, could be im-
plied from the utterance or act.249
Essentially, implied assertions could encompass all out-of-court 
utterances because no person can reasonably distinguish offering an 
utterance for an implied assertion from offering it for another reason.  
Indeed, whether certain conduct conceivably could produce an im-
plied assertion is subjective.
   
250  The term implied assertion, when the 
declarant does not intend to communicate, essentially means evi-
dence regardless of communicative words.251
For instance, a judge would determine that an ordinary letter is 
an implied assertion that its recipient is competent under the same 
reasoning he would use to determine a cloudy sky was an implied as-
sertion that it would likely rain.
   
252
 
 246. Cf. Long, 905 F.2d at 1580 (“Long has not provided any evidence to suggest that the 
caller, through her questions, intended to assert that he was involved in drug dealing.”). 
  No difference between non-
communicative conduct and communicative conduct exists unless the 
 247. See infra text accompanying notes 250–258. 
 248. Garner, 414 Md. at 388, 995 A.2d at 704 (explaining that almost any question con-
tains an implied assertion). 
 249. Fields v. State, 168 Md. App. 22, 32, 895 A.2d 339, 345 (2006), aff’d, 395 Md. 758, 
912 A.2d 637 (2006). 
 250. Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 737, 887 A.2d 564, 597 (Wilner, J., concurring) 
(explaining that all conduct could arguably be an implied assertion and how the implied 
assertion doctrine is becoming entwined with circumstantial evidence and state of mind). 
 251. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 
76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 418 n.153 (1992) (finding implied assertion “divorces” the word as-
sertion from normal usage and changes it into evidence). 
 252. Id. 
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judge takes intent to express or communicate into account.253  Since 
implied assertions do not account for communicative intent, they 
could encompass all verbal and non-verbal conduct.254  In turn, there 
could be no end to what could be considered hearsay.255
That almost every out-of-court utterance could be said to contain 
any inference it is offered to prove makes it difficult for judges and 
litigants to limit the scope of implied assertions.  As the D.C. Circuit 
has noted, “It is difficult to imagine any question, or for that matter 
any act, that does not in some way convey an implicit message.”
   
256  In 
Garner, the Court of Special Appeals acknowledged, “[E]very utter-
ance can arguably be deemed to be an implied assertion of the thing 
it is offered to prove.”257  And the Court of Appeals in Garner even 
stated that every question may contain an implied assertion.258
In sum, courts should not consider all out-of-court utterances 
hearsay merely because the proponent of the utterances uses them to 
support a material inference.
  
259
 
 253. Id. 
  The drafters of the rules of evidences 
and the courts likely do not wish to deem every out-of-court utterance 
inadmissible.  As such, to remain consistent with the purpose of the 
hearsay rule, and to avoid confusion among judges and litigants, the 
Court of Appeals should have expressly acknowledged that implied 
assertions were no longer hearsay under the Maryland Rules of Evi-
dence.   
 254. See DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 1.10 at 1–17 (4th ed. 2001) (explaining 
that any conduct could imply an assertion and giving the example of a person fleeing a 
scene, impliedly asserting that they did something wrong). Typically, this fleeing would be 
mere circumstantial evidence that the person fleeing committed the murder.  Id.  As seen 
in this example, almost identical evidence currently can be deemed hearsay in some courts 
and circumstantial evidence in other courts.  Compare Headley v. Tilghman, 53 F.3d 472, 
477 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that questions from an unidentified caller, “Are you up? Can I 
come by? Are you ready?,” were not admitted for their truth but as circumstantial evidence 
that the defendant used his beeper to receive requests for drugs), with Mosley v. State, 141 
S.W.3d 816, 829–31 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the words, “Well, I can't watch 
them all the time” were hearsay when offered to prove the truth of the declarant's implied 
belief that her husband had sexually assaulted their granddaughter). 
 255. BINDER, supra note 254, at 1–17. 
 256. United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1990).   
 257. Garner v. State, 183 Md. App. 122, 145, 960 A.2d 646, 662 (2008), aff’d, 414 Md. 
372, 995 A.2d 684 (2010). 
 258. Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372, 388, 995 A.2d 694, 704 (2010). 
 259. United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In Garner v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed 
the admissibility of a question asked out-of-court that was offered to 
prove that a person sold drugs.260  The court held the question ad-
missible pursuant to Maryland’s hearsay definition, in part because 
the question did not contain the implied assertion that the person 
sold drugs.261  In so holding, the court failed to apply its precedent 
regarding implied assertions262 and substituted the definition of asser-
tion used by a majority of federal and state courts.263  This unspoken 
adoption creates conflicting precedent and will necessarily cause in-
consistent arguments by litigants, ad hoc rulings by trial judges, and 
unsound holdings by appellate judges.264  The court could have 
avoided this conflicting precedent and stopped implied assertions 
from swallowing the hearsay rule by officially embracing the federal 
definition of assertion and ending Maryland’s struggle with implied 
assertions.265
 
   
 
 260. 414 Md. 372, 374, 995 A.2d 694, 695 (2010). 
 261. Id. at 388, 995 A.2d at 704. 
 262. See supra Part IV.A. 
 263. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 264. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 265. See supra Part IV.C. 
